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Aging populations in advanced economies are placing ever-increasing demands on government spending
in the form of old-age benefits. Economies that have promised substantially more benefits than they
have made provision to finance are heading into a prolonged era of fiscal stress. Unresolved fiscal
stress raises the possibility that the economies will hit their fiscal limits where taxes and spending
no longer adjust to stabilize debt. In such economies, monetary policy may lose its ability to control
inflation and influence the economy in the usual ways. The paper discusses models of fiscal limits
and their implications and lays out a research agenda to integrate political economy and empirical
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1 Introduction
Extreme ﬁscal stress and fears of outright sovereign debt default were once the exclusive do-
mains of emerging economies, and a sizeable literature has grown up to understand the causes
and consequences of those ﬁscal crises. But these are topsy-turvy times. Emerging economies
are in good ﬁscal shape, while advanced economies are heading into a prolonged era of ﬁs-
cal stress. Important structural diﬀerences between emerging and advanced economies may
limit applying insights from the emerging markets literature to the problems that advanced
economies face.
Large adverse external shocks frequently precipitate sovereign debt crises in emerg-
ing economies.1 Emerging economies typically have weak ﬁscal infrastructures that make
the countries’ government ﬁnances especially susceptible to shocks originating outside their
economies—large swings in commodity prices, sudden stops of capital inﬂows, sharp changes
in real exchange rates—as well as to tax evasion and the swift movement of economic activ-
ity underground. Weak ﬁscal infrastructures, combined with fragile political systems, ﬁxed
exchange rates, and government debt denominated in foreign currency, can leave the econ-
omy with no choice but to default or substantially restructure its sovereign debt obligations.
Important ingredients in these crises are: they usually come on suddenly, with few early
warning signals; following a default, the country is temporarily locked out of credit markets,
making default potentially costly in terms of output losses; several emerging economies are
serial defaulters, so ﬁscal crises are recurring, rather than one-oﬀ events.
Fiscal stress facing advanced economies diﬀers from this characterization of emerging
economies along several dimensions. In most, but not all, advanced economies, ﬁscal stress
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1Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) is an excellent recent survey of sovereign debt crises in emerging
economies, while Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) provide a broader historical perspective on ﬁnancial crises.
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has been a slowly evolving problem brought on by aging populations and pay-as-you-go
social beneﬁts programs for the aged. Growing promised old-age beneﬁts, with no plans
on the books to ﬁnance them, have placed ﬁscal projections on unsustainable trajectories.
Advanced economies tend to be more diversiﬁed and, therefore, less sensitive to external
disturbances, while their political systems are more stable and their ﬁscal infrastructures
more sound. Flexible exchange rates and home currency denominated government debt
open channels of adjustment to ﬁscal stress that are not available to emerging economies.
Table 1 reports the International Monetary Fund’s (2009) calculations of the net present
value of aging-related spending in several advanced economies. Averaged across the G-20
countries, spending promises exceed funding plans to the tune of 400 percent of GDP. In the
United States alone, the long-term imbalance associated with Social Security and Medicare
is $75 trillion in present value [Gokhale and Smetters (2007)]. Although the Australian ﬁscal
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Table 1: Net present value of impact on ﬁscal deﬁcit of aging-related spending, in percent
of GDP. Source: International Monetary Fund (2009).
Emerging economies do not face the ﬁscal stress depicted in table 1, in large part be-
cause their populations are much younger. With more young people working to support
beneﬁts to the old, the type of ﬁscal stress facing advanced economies does not appear on
the horizon for emerging economies, as ﬁgure 1 illustrates. The ﬁgure shows how old-age
dependency ratios—population aged 65 or over relative to population aged 15-64—change
across time in selected advanced and emerging economies. Japan stands out as having the
oldest population in 2005 and projected for 2050, with Korea, Germany, and Spain not far
behind. Emerging economies have much younger populations, now and going forward, than
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do advanced economies. Because advanced economies also tend to have broader old-age
programs, their older populations portend ever-increasing demands on government spending
coupled with an ever-shrinking stock of young workers to support those demands. This is a










Figure 1: Population aging in advanced and emerging economies, 1960 (left bar), 2005 (center
bar) and 2050 (right bar). Old-age dependency ratio, deﬁned as population aged 65 or over
relative to population aged 15-64, in percent. Source: United Nations (2008).
With emerging economies in mind, theoretical work on sovereign debt default has largely
built on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) to address the question of why creditors are willing to
lend to sovereigns in the ﬁrst place. Eaton and Gersovitz’s key emphasis was on a sovereign’s
willingness to pay, rather than its ability. Another line of work treats sovereign debt default
as an economic or political necessity, rather than as the outgrowth of an optimal policy
problem, and derives the implications for monetary policy’s ability to control inﬂation [Uribe
(2006), Schabert (2010), and Bi, Leeper, and Leith (2010)].2
A third line of attack takes outright default oﬀ the table to examine the impacts of
2See also Juessen, Linnemann, and Schabert (2009), Bi (2009), and Bi and Leeper (2010) for non-monetary
analyses.
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alternative ﬁscal and monetary policy adjustments that ensure government solvency.3 To our
thinking, this line may be most pertinent to the problems facing many advanced economies
with no recent history of sovereign debt default.
Ruling out default means that bondholders must expect some adjustments in future
policies to occur that ensure the government continues to honor its debt obligations. Most
governments have been exceedingly uninformative about which policies will adjust and when
they will adjust. In the absence of credible policy plans, it is reasonable for people to
contemplate the possibility that unresolved ﬁscal stress will push the economy to its ﬁscal
limit—the point beyond which taxes and government expenditures can no longer adjust to
stabilize the value of government debt. Macroeconomic policies can perform very diﬀerently
in an economy that is staring at its ﬁscal limit. This paper describes how ﬁscal stress can
aﬀect the macro economy: ﬁrst, by undermining the ability of the central bank to control
inﬂation and inﬂuence the real economy in the usual ways; second, by injecting additional
uncertainty into the economy. Beyond the literature on sovereign debt default, there is little
work on how to model ﬁscal limits. We discuss what has been done on ﬁscal limits and how
that work can be improved. The paper concludes by sketching a research agenda, pointing
to some major unresolved theoretical and empirical issues associated with ﬁscal stress; there
are many.
2 Fiscal Stress, Inflation Control, and Heightened Uncertainty
A simple model can illustrate how unresolved ﬁscal stress and its concomitant uncertainty
about future policies undermines the central bank’s ability to control inﬂation.4 The model
emphasizes that monetary and ﬁscal policies have two tasks to perform—control inﬂation
and stabilize the value of government debt—and it points to two diﬀerent policy assignments
that can achieve those tasks, but with very diﬀerent consequences for monetary and ﬁscal
policy eﬀects.
2.1 A Model We now lay out a simple model that describes the link between ﬁscal
limits and inﬂation. The economy lasts for S periods. A representative household receives
an endowment, y, of goods each period and chooses sequences of consumption and bonds,





tu(ct), 0 <β<1( 1 )
3Work taking this approach includes Cochrane (2011), Daniel and Shiamptanis (2010), Davig, Leeper,
and Walker (2010, 2011), Davig and Leeper (2010), and Sims (2011).
4The points that this illustrative model make have been generalized in numerical work by [Davig, Leeper,
and Walker (2010, 2011) and Davig and Leeper (2010)].
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taking prices and R−1B−1 > 0 as given. The household pays taxes, τt, and receives transfers,
λtzt, each period, both of which are lump sum. Bonds are denominated in nominal terms
(“dollars”) and pay a gross nominal return of R. The budget constraint distinguishes between
the transfers that the government promises to pay, zt, and the transfers the government
actually delivers, λtzt, which must ultimately be ﬁnanced.
Government spending is zero each period, so the government chooses sequences of taxes,
delivered transfers, and debt to satisfy its ﬂow constraint
Bt
Pt




given R−1B−1 > 0, while the monetary authority chooses a sequence for the nominal interest
rate.
After imposing goods market clearing, ct = y for t ≥ 0, the household’s consumption









The exogenous (ﬁxed) gross real interest rate, 1/β, makes the analysis easier but is not
without some loss of generality, as Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010) show in the context of
ﬁscal ﬁnancing in a model with nominal rigidities.
2.2 Policy Behavior Monetary policy follows a conventional interest rate rule, written













where π∗ is the inﬂation target and R∗ = π∗/β is the steady state nominal interest rate.
When α>1/β monetary policy is hawkish, responding to increases in inﬂation by sharply
raising the nominal interest rate with the aim of stabilizing inﬂation around π∗. This is called
“active” monetary policy. Weak responses of interest rates to inﬂation are called “passive”
monetary policy.
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where b∗ is the debt target, τ∗ is the steady state level of taxes, and r =1 /β − 1 is the net
real interest rate. When γ>rany increase in government debt creates an expectation that
future taxes will rise by enough to both service the higher debt and retire it back to b∗.T h i s
is called “passive” ﬁscal policy. Weak responses of taxes to debt correspond to “active” ﬁscal
policy.
We assume that “promised” government transfers evolve exogenously according to the
stochastic process
zt =( 1− ρ)z
∗ + ρzt−1 + εt, 0 <ρ<1( 7 )
where z∗ is steady-state transfers and εt is a serially uncorrelated shock with Etεt+1 =0 .
Most macroeconomic models contain no uncertainty about future policy regimes, making
the implausible assumption that agents know exactly what monetary and ﬁscal policies will
be in eﬀect at every date in the future. Although this assumption is widely maintained, it
is diﬃcult to reconcile the assumption with observed policy behavior. In fact, policies do
change and, therefore, they can change. In the face of a history of changes in policy regimes,
analyses that fail to incorporate the possibility of regime change into expectations formation
run the risk of misspecifying expectations and providing misleading policy advice.5 Given the
prominent role ascribed to expectations formation in policy discussions and deliberations,
this is a potentially serious misspeciﬁcation of policy models.
We introduce uncertainty about policy in a stark fashion that allows us to extract some
implications of policy uncertainty while retaining analytical tractability. The economy hits
the ﬁscal limit at a known date T, at which point taxes become active, no longer responding
to stabilize debt. At the ﬁscal limit, taxes are ﬁxed: τt = τmax for all t ≥ T. Uncertainty
arises because agents are uncertain which policy regime will be adopted at the ﬁscal limit.
Agents place probability q on a regime that combines passive monetary policy with active
transfers policy. Active transfers means that promised transfers are delivered and λt =1 .
In this regime, neither taxes nor transfers can adjust to stabilize debt, so monetary policy
takes on the role of stabilizing debt.
Agents place probability 1 − q on a regime with active monetary policy and passive
transfers policy. In polite company, passive transfers policy is referred to as “entitlements
5This is the theme of Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon (1982, 1984), Sims (1982, 1987), Andolfatto and
Gomme (2003), Leeper and Zha (2003), Davig (2004), Davig and Leeper (2006b,a, 2007, 2011), Chung,
Davig, and Leeper (2007), and Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010).
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reform.” To avoid the tangle of euphemisms, we refer to this as “reneging on promised
transfers.” Instead of receiving promised transfers of zt at time t, agents receive λtzt [λt ∈
(0,1)], a fraction of promised transfers that the government honors. That fraction adjusts as
needed to stabilize debt. Because monetary policy continues to aggressively target inﬂation,
once the economy enters this regime, inﬂation will always be on target: πt = π∗ for t ≥ T.
For simplicity, we reduce the model to just four periods. In the initial two periods
(t =0 ,1), the ﬁscal limit has not been reached, promised transfers follow the process in (7),
monetary policy is active and tax policy is passive. The economy begins with R−1B−1 > 0
given and some arbitrary P−1. At the beginning of period two (t = 2), the ﬁscal limit is
reached but agents remain uncertain about which mix of policies will be adopted. This
uncertainty is resolved at the end of period 2, so that in period 3 there is no uncertainty
about policy.
2.3 Equilibrium Combining the Fisher relation, (4), with the active monetary policy






































Agents know that in the next period (t = 2) the ﬁscal limit will be reached and policy
will switch to either a passive monetary/active transfers regime with probability q,o ra n
active monetary/passive transfers regime with probability (1−q). Assume that the reneging
rate is ﬁxed and known at t =0 ,s oλ2 = λ3 = λ ∈ [0,1]. Then the conditional probability
distribution of these policies is given by
Probability Monetary Policy Transfers Policy
qR
−1
2 = R∗−1 z2 = ρz1 + ε2
(1 − q) R
−1






λz2 = λρz1 + λε2
7Leeper & Walker: Fiscal Limits in Advanced Economies





































In (11)w eh a v ei m p o s e dt h a tτmax = τ∗, the steady state level of taxes, in order to make
the relationships transparent.
In period 3, τ3 is set to completely retire debt (B3 = 0) no matter which policy regime is
realized in period 2. This corresponds to τ3 = δz3 +(R2B2)/P3,w h e r eδ = 1 if the economy
is in the passive monetary/active transfers regime and δ = λ if the active monetary/passive
transfer regime is realized. This assumption implies that agents know one period in advance
which tax policy will be in place in the ﬁnal period.
Combining (8)a n d( 10), we obtain a relationship that connects expected inﬂation between




















Given the discount rate β, this solution for expected inﬂation shows that whether expected
inﬂation converges to target or drifts from target depends on the probability of switching to
passive monetary/active transfers policies relative to how hawkishly monetary policy targets
inﬂation when it is active.
Since we assume that taxes in period 3 are known, and they are a function of exogenous
objects, we can treat τ3 as ﬁxed. Combining (9)a n d( 11) and imposing that B3 =0a st h e











∗) − (ϑz3 − z
∗)] − β(ϑz2 − z
∗) − (z1 − z
∗)} (13)
where ϑ = q +( 1− q)λ determines expected post-reneging transfers.
Because all the objects on the right side of (13) are known or exogenous, this expression
uniquely determines the value of debt in period 0 as a function of the expected present
value of surpluses. We can combine (13) with the government’s ﬂow constraint at t =0t o
obtain a unique expression for P0 as a function of R−1B−1, τ0, z0, and the parameters in the
expression for equilibrium B0/P0.
2.4 Implications Solutions (12)a n d( 13), together with the government’s budget con-
straint, yield the equilibrium price level, expected inﬂation, and nominal debt at the initial
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date, t = 0. The solutions encapsulate the sense in which monetary policy loses control of
inﬂation if ﬁscal expectations are not appropriately anchored. We can now summarize the
implications:
1. Monetary policy can consistently achieve its inﬂation target, πt = π∗,o n l yi fﬁ s c a l
expectations are anchored on policies in which debt is stabilized entirely by ﬁscal
adjustments. In this model, such anchoring requires that q =0 ,s ot h e r ei sno possibility
of a regime in which monetary policy becomes passive (0 ≤ α<1/β) and transfers
policy is active, with promised transfers being fully honored (λ =1 ) .
2. If people deem the passive monetary/active transfers regime to be possible, q>0, then
expressions (12)a n d( 13) guide the determination of actual and expected inﬂation,
yielding some striking results.
(a) For a given q>0, the more hawkish is monetary policy, the more decoupled
expected inﬂation is from past inﬂation: in (12), larger α m a k e sd e v i a t i o n so f
expected inﬂation from target drift farther from deviations of actual inﬂation
from target.
(b) As the probability of the passive monetary/active transfers regime, q,r i s e s ,e x -
pected inﬂation departs less from actual inﬂation; in fact, as q → 1, expected
inﬂation converges to π∗.
(c) Higher q reduces the value of debt in expression (13), which raises the initial price
level, P0.
(d) The smaller the rate of reneging on transfers, λ, the lower the value of debt and
the higher the price level P0.
Higher q and lower λ raise inﬂation through the standard ﬁscal theory of the price level
mechanisms.6 Higher q means there is less likelihood that the government will renege, so
expected transfers and, therefore, household wealth rise. Households attempt to convert
the higher wealth into consumption goods, driving up the price level until real wealth falls
suﬃciently that households are content to consume their original consumption place. Lower
λ also raises the expected value of transfers, increasing wealth and raising the price level
through the same channels.
Expectational eﬀects associated with switching policies can be seen explicitly in (12)
and (13). Equation (13) shows that the value of debt is still determined by the discounted
6See, for example, Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (2001), or Walsh (2003) for expositions of the
ﬁscal theory.
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expected value of net surpluses. In contrast to models without uncertainty about future
policies, now the actual surplus is conditional on the realized policy regime. Conditional on
time t = 0 information, the expected transfers process in periods 2 and 3 is unknown. If
q ∈ (0,1) and at the end of period two passive monetary policy is realized, agents will be
“surprised” by amount z2(1−q)(1−λ)i np e r i o d2a n db ya m o u n tz3(1−q)(1−λ) in period
3. With transfers surprisingly high—because the passive transfers regime with reneging was
not realized—households feel wealthier and try to convert that wealth into consumption.
This drives up the price level in periods 2 and 3, revaluing debt downward. This surprise
acts as an innovation to the agent’s information set due to policy uncertainty. Naturally,
as agents put high probability on this regime occurring (q ≈ 1) or assume the amount of
reneging is small (λ2,λ 3 ≈ 1), the surprise is also small, and vice versa.
Expected inﬂation in period 1 now depends on q, which summarizes beliefs about future
policies. But q is a parameter of both monetary and transfers policy. This illustrates that
monetary policy alone cannot determine either actual or expected inﬂation. If agents put high
probability on the passive monetary/active transfers regime (q ≈ 1), then expected inﬂation
at the beginning of period 2 will be primarily pinned down by the nominal interest rate peg.
It is in this sense that expectational eﬀects about policy uncertainty can dramatically alter
equilibrium outcomes.
In this simple setup, these expectational eﬀects are limited in magnitude because agents
know precisely when the ﬁscal limit is reached. The additional level of uncertainty not exam-
ined in these simple models, but present in Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010), is randomness
about when tax policy will hit the the ﬁscal limit. In that environment, the conditional prob-
ability of switching policies outlined above would contain an additional term specifying the
conditional probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit in that period. This implies that, because
there is positive probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit in every period up to T, these expec-
tational eﬀects will be present from t =0 ,...,T and will gradually become more prominent
as the probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit increases. In eﬀect, the endogenous probability
of hitting the ﬁscal limit makes the probability q time varying.
The illustrative model places in high relief a general lesson for policymakers: unresolved
ﬁscal stress can undermine the ability of monetary policy to control inﬂation, regardless of
how devoutly the central bank targets inﬂation. Loss of inﬂation control arises for ﬁscal
reasons that are beyond the purview of the central bank. More aggressive inﬂation targeting
cannot compensate for inappropriately anchored ﬁscal expectations.
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3 Modeling Fiscal Limits
Although there is little doubt that every country possesses a ﬁscal limit, we are very far from
understanding how to quantify that limit. Once more setting aside sovereign debt default as
a type of ﬁscal limit, there are at least three categories of limits that arise in the literature.
Sargent and Wallace (1981) invoke that the public’s desired level of savings imposes
an upper bound on the equilibrium debt-GDP ratio that can be attained. Their economy
starts in a regime where both monetary and ﬁscal policy are active—money growth and the
primary ﬁscal surplus are exogenous processes—and government debt accumulates to cover
any budget shortfalls. When debt reaches its upper bound, Sargent and Wallace posit that
monetary policy switches to passively generate the seigniorage revenues required to stabilize
debt at that ﬁscal limit.
The notion that the debt-GDP ratio must be bounded is closely related to the second
category of ﬁscal limits: higher distorting taxes diminish incentives to work, save, and invest,
so there is some set of tax rates that maximize tax revenue and place the economy at the
peak of its Laﬀer curves.7 Holding government expenditures ﬁxed, maximum tax revenues
imply some maximum stream of primary surpluses. Because government debt derives its
value from the expected present value of primary surpluses plus seigniorage revenues, and
that present value is bounded, so, too, is the size of government debt relative to the economy.
Tax distortions, therefore, create a natural ﬁscal limit by imposing a limit on the “cash ﬂows”
that support government debt.
Although it provides a natural economic ﬁscal limit, Laﬀer curve reasoning fails to bring
in political economy arguments that are more likely to determine ﬁscal limits in democratic
societies. Top all-in marginal tax rates vary tremendously across advanced economies: from
38 percent in New Zealand to 63 percent in Denmark, and averaging about 48 percent.8
Trabandt and Uhlig (2009) estimate that, with only a couple of exceptions, average labor,
capital, and consumption tax rates in 14 European Union countries and the United States
lie below the peak of their respective Laﬀer curves and, frequently, well below the peak. By
revealed preferences, even countries that face ﬁscal stress are reluctant to push tax rates to
the point where revenue is maximized.
We believe that both economic and political factors weigh heavily in the ﬁscal limit
7Some authors have studied equilibria in which debt is not bounded in order to argue that mone-
tarist/Ricardian equilibria are, in some sense, “general” [McCallum (1984) and Canzoneri, Cumby, and
Diba (2001)]. Those equilibria fall apart, however, under the plausible assumption that the government does
not have unlimited access to non-distorting taxes.
8Statistics based on the marginal combined personal income tax rate on gross wage income (derived
according to the OECD Taxing Wages framework) for a single person without dependants based on the
earnings level where the top statutory rate ﬁrst applies, combined central and sub-central governments
[Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2009)].
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calculus. Political intolerance of high and rising marginal tax rates is likely to place an
eﬀective upper bound on rates well before reaching the peak of the Laﬀer curve. Major tax
reforms in the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and elsewhere in the 1980s and
1990s, which dramatically lowered marginal tax rates across the board, were brought on by
demands by the electorate for smaller government or reduced ineﬃciencies. That political
consensus continues to reign even as populations age and ﬁscal stresses grow.
Several papers take a reduced-form approach to modeling political intolerance for rising
marginal tax rates [Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010, 2011), Davig and Leeper (2010), and
Richter (2011)]. Those papers posit that, as in the simple model above, there is a regime
in which higher debt is ﬁnanced by higher marginal tax rates. But as tax rates increase,
political dissatisfaction rises. An increasingly disgruntled electorate raises the probability
that the economy will hit its ﬁscal limit, at which point tax rates can no longer rise. Figure
2 illustrates the logistic function those papers employ to characterize how the probability of
the limit increases with the tax rate.
























































As debt rises, tax rates
rise to stabilize debt
Higher tax rates make
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Figure 2: Probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit—a ﬁxed maximum marginal tax rate—as a
function of the tax rate. Source: Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010).
This reduced-form approach has the virtue of treating the ﬁscal limit as uncertain, yet
dependent on the state of ﬁscal policy. But it also has important shortcomings. First, there
is no microeconomic rationale for using a logistic function to describe how the probability
of hitting the limit evolves over time. Second, it is not obvious how best to connect the
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parameters of the ﬁscal limit function to observed data. Third, by taking a reduced-form
approach, the method does not attempt to model any of the political or economic factors
that determine the ﬁscal limit. Finally, as ﬁgure 2 makes clear, the limit is couched only in
terms of tax adjustments; social attitudes toward the government’s provision of goods and
services play an equally important role in ﬁscal adjustments.
Understanding what factors inﬂuence a society’s attitudes toward taxation and govern-
ment spending is essential to understand the consequences of ﬁscal stress. We turn now to
suggestions for future research that will contribute to that understanding.
4A R e s e a r c h A g e n d a
A country’s ﬁscal limit depends not only on the current ﬁscal situation but also on expected
future surpluses and is therefore, unobservable. For this reason, there are many subtle
aspects to understanding and modeling ﬁscal limits in advanced economies. This section
focuses on four elements of ﬁscal limits that we believe are important for future research:
[i] identifying policy behavior; [ii] quantifying ﬁscal limits; [iii] integrating heterogeneity and
policy uncertainty; [iv] anchoring ﬁscal expectations appropriately so that monetary policy
can control inﬂation. These elements are obviously interrelated. Quantifying ﬁscal limits
requires an accurate depiction of policy behavior, which depends on modeling the political
economy, and so forth. The list is not exhaustive, but represents our views about the most
important omissions in our own work and in the current literature.
4.1 Identifying Policy Behavior Leeper (2010) argues that conducting ﬁscal policy
analysis is much more challenging than monetary policy analysis due to “ﬁscal complexity.”
Relative to monetary policy, ﬁscal policy makers have an ever-expanding range of ﬁscal
instruments at their disposal—a complex tax code, a range of government spending decisions,
debt maturity structure, and so forth. And the ability to legislate implies entirely new ﬁscal
instruments can be created to deal with ﬁscal stress. All of these ﬁscal instruments will have
an impact on a country’s ﬁscal limit. In light of this complexity, modeling or identifying ﬁscal
policy behavior can be quite challenging. But because these ﬁscal changes distort important
economic margins, an accurate depiction of (future) policy behavior is critical to modeling
ﬁscal limits.
Advanced economies have sophisticated political economy structures underlying their
ﬁscal policies. Modeling ﬁscal policy using simple rules or as a benevolent social planner (or
malevolent dictator), as is often done, seems inappropriate. Replacing the logistic curve of
ﬁgure 2 with a coherent political economy structure would advance the literature.
Recent work in political economy incorporates intricate policy formulations into a dy-
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namic, stochastic, equilibrium framework [for example, Battaglini and Coate (2008)]. En-
titlements reform is an example. As outlined in section 2.2, which draws on the work by
Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010, 2011) and Davig and Leeper (2010), entitlements reform
or “reneging” on promised transfers enters the model through a reduced form parameter λ,
the fraction of promised transfers that is delivered. Calibrating λ is quite diﬃcult without
linking it explicitly to the political economy. Many citizens view promised old-age bene-
ﬁts as a social contract whose violation has wide-ranging repercussions for the relationship
between the electorate and its government. Here there is an inherent tension: ﬁscal stress
is arising from aging populations, but it is the same bulge in the population that is being
asked to sacriﬁce through entitlements reform—will the old vote to make themselves less
well oﬀ? Capturing these delicate relationships through a political economy setup would be
a welcome addition to the literature.
It is not feasible to capture every dimension of ﬁscal policy in identifying policy behavior.
To understand ﬁscal limits, it might be more important to identify speciﬁc characteristics
of policy formation. For example, policy stickiness suggests that advanced economies with
well-developed democratic institutions may not be able to act quickly enough to mitigate
the deleterious eﬀects of ﬁscal limits [Alesina and Drazen (1991)]. Stickiness is an outgrowth
of the checks and balances of a democratic society, “by which the excellences of republican
government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided,” as Hamilton (1787)
wrote. But policy stickiness may also hasten the arrival of a ﬁscal limit by delaying the
policy responses that would keep the economy away from the limit. Auerbach and Hassett
(1992, 2001, 2002) and Hassett and Metcalf (1999) show that policy stickiness dramatically
aﬀects investment and consumption decisions in a standard dynamic stochastic overlapping
generations model. Auerbach and Hassett (2007) ﬁnd that policy stickiness dramatically
changes the nature of the equilibrium and of optimal policy. These results would be ampliﬁed
in an environment with a looming ﬁscal limit.
4.2 Quantifying Fiscal Limits How close is a country to its ﬁscal limit? This question
is central to articulating the options available to policy makers and to understanding the
economic ramiﬁcations of a ﬁscal limit. But there is a dearth of research on the question.
Quantifying the ﬁscal limit is challenging for reasons of ﬁscal complexity and because it relies
on taking stands on unknown policy outcomes. There may be ways, though, to estimate a
country’s ﬁscal limit. For example, one policy option is to raise taxes to continue to fund
old-age beneﬁts until tax revenues decline; that is, until the peak of the Laﬀer curve is
reached. Countries that are currently close to the peak of the Laﬀer curve will hit the ﬁscal
limit sooner than those with room to raise taxes and increase revenue.
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Recent work by Trabandt and Uhlig (2009) attempts to estimate Laﬀer curves for several
countries. They document tremendous diversity in tax rates (and tax structures) across
advanced countries. In 2007 the highest labor income tax rate was in Sweden (54.6 percent)
and the lowest was in the United States (28.4 percent); for capital tax rates, the highest was
in Denmark (59.3 percent) and the lowest was in Greece (14.5 percent); the United States
had the lowest consumption tax rate by far (4.2 percent), while Denmark had the highest
(34.3 percent). Using estimates from a stochastic growth model, Trabandt and Uhlig ﬁnd
similar heterogeneity with regard to where countries lie on their Laﬀer curves. They claim
that some countries are already operating on the wrong side of the Laﬀer curve, while others
have a substantial buﬀer before hitting the peak of the Laﬀer curve. Coupled with the fact
that many advanced economies have dramatically diﬀerent government spending programs,
tax diversity suggests that a one-size-ﬁts-all approach to quantifying ﬁscal limits would be
unproductive. Many pundits (and academics) cite the debt-to-GDP ratio as a measure of
ﬁscal stress. Trabandt and Uhlig’s results argue for more subtlety. For example, suppose
two countries have identical debt-to-GDP ratios but country A is operating on the wrong
side of the Laﬀer curve, while country B still has the ability to raise tax revenues. Surely,
country B is much further away from its ﬁscal limit.9
There is a clear need to take models of ﬁscal policy to data as Trabandt and Uhlig
(2009) have done. But the ﬁscal stress facing advanced economies is unprecedented, which
raises the question: how can we extrapolate from past data to better quantify the ﬁscal
limit? While the United States and several other countries have encountered some form
of ﬁscal stress in past decades, this time is diﬀerent. At no point in the history of the
United States (or other advanced economies) have we had the demographic trends playing
out today. These are important limitations to the data that must be overcome through solid
theoretical foundations. However, just as we should not rely solely on data that have no
relevant observations, we also should not throw out all data and rely only on theoretical
constructs.
We oﬀer two examples of how data might be able to enhance our understanding of ﬁscal
stress and ﬁscal limits. First, while there are few relevant data points to quantify ﬁscal
limits in advanced economies, there are some projections that are likely to be quite accurate.
These projections could be inserted into general equilibrium models as a way to simulate data
points. For example, demographic projections over the next 20 to 50 years will be accurate
(barring some unforeseen catastrophe). While we are unsure of how ﬁscal policy will respond
9Ghosh, Kim, Mendoza, Ostry, and Qureshi (2011) use data for 23 advanced economies from 1970–2007
and to conclude that ﬁscal limits vary substantially across advanced economies. Bi (2009) documents the
wide range of debt-GDP ratios at which countries run into sovereign debt problems.
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to aging baby boomers, we are relatively conﬁdent that projections of old-age dependency
ratios, like those in ﬁgure 1, will come to fruition. These demographic changes would be the
driving processes in a political economy model that examines alternative policy responses
to ﬁscal stress. In a similar fashion, Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010) use Congressional
Budget Oﬃce projections of the growth in entitlements programs over the next 60 years
to calibrate a nonstationary transfers process. Although it is debatable whether promised
entitlements will actually be paid in the future, it is hard to argue that the CBO is grossly
miscalculating the trend growth rate in these spending programs.
A second example involves a recent occurrence in American politics to combat ﬁscal
pressures. In times of ﬁscal stress, proposals to amend the U.S. constitution to require
the federal government to operate under a balanced budget rule gain currency. Calls for
a balanced budget amendment became particularly strident in the 1980s and 1990s. An
amendment requiring a balanced budget was nearly passed in 1995: the House of Represen-
tative approved the amendment by 300 to 132 but it fell one vote short in the Senate. More
recently, Senators Lindsay Graham and Jim DeMint introduced a balanced budget amend-
ment last year (SJ Res 24), which is still in committee. As ﬁscal pressures increase, this type
of policy reaction becomes increasingly likely. Although this empirical observation does not
provide a clear indication of how to model ﬁscal policy, it does suggest the importance of
building in the possibility of adopting a policy rule that incorporates a balanced budget.
4.3 Combining Heterogeneity with Policy Uncertainty There is a large and
compelling literature that focuses on important intergenerational and distributional conse-
quences of ﬁscal stress and ﬁscal limits [for example, Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987), Kotlikoﬀ,
Smetters, and Walliser (1998a,b, 2007), ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and Joines (1995, 1999),
Huggett and Ventura (1999), Cooley and Soares (1999), De Nardi, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and Sargent
(1999), Altig, Auerbach, Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (2001), and Smetters and Walliser
(2004)]. The canonical model used in these papers is an overlapping generations model in
which each cohort lives for 55 periods. This model permits rich dynamics in demographics—
population-age distributions, increasing longevity—intra-generational heterogeneity, bequest
motives, liquidity constraints, earnings uncertainty, and so forth; it also allows for ﬂexibil-
ity in modeling ﬁscal variables and alternative policy scenarios. The literature emphasizes
that heterogeneity in demographics and policy are ﬁrst order when considering how ﬁscal
policy aﬀects welfare. The richness and complexity of the models, though, mean that only
perfect foresight equilibria (or slight deviations from perfect foresight) are computed. The
forward looking nature of the equilibrium pushes nearly all of the eﬀects of ﬁscal stress into
the present, which places unrealistically high weight on gloom-and-doom outcomes that are
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diﬃcult to reconcile with observed data.
Papers by Davig, Leeper and Walker focus on modeling policy uncertainty and the com-
plex interactions between ﬁscal and monetary policies. Their shortcoming is that the analysis
is carried out in a representative agent environment that does not address the important dis-
tributional eﬀects of ﬁscal policy.
A synthesis of these two approaches is essential for eﬀectively modeling ﬁscal limits.
Ignoring heterogeneity ignores the root cause of the problem. Demographics are driving the
economy closer to the ﬁscal limit. But ignoring policy uncertainty assumes agents know
far too much about pending policy adjustments. While acknowledging the need to act,
politicians have done very little to inform their constituents about which policies will adjust
and when.
Capturing both heterogeneity and substantial policy uncertainty in a dynamic, stochas-
tic general equilibrium model is challenging. Nonlinear methods, which come with steep
computational costs, must be employed. Recent work by Richter (2011) is an example of a
model that captures both elements. He introduces a nonstationary promised entitlements
process into the inﬁnite period OLG setup of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985). The pri-
mary beneﬁt of his setup vis-a-vis traditional OLG frameworks is the ability to examine
the distributional consequences of ﬁscal uncertainty. The ﬂexibility of the model permits a
regime-switching approach to policy uncertainty along with an OLG framework to address
distributional eﬀects. Preliminary results suggest that the distributional consequences of
policy uncertainty are substantial. These ﬁndings are intriguing and further work along
these lines is needed.
4.4 Anchoring Fiscal Expectations and Non-Rational Expectations As the
simple model in section 2.2 makes clear, anchoring ﬁscal expectations in the appropriate way
is essential for monetary policy to control inﬂation. Once taxes have reached the ﬁscal limit,
there are only two possible sources of ﬁscal ﬁnancing: [i] reneging on promised transfers and
[ii] surprise revaluations of outstanding nominal government bonds. Only under case [i] does
an active monetary policy rule—such as the Taylor rule—continue to control inﬂation.
In a rational expectations environment, if agents place positive probability on scenario
[ii] (even if it is not realized), monetary policy loses control of inﬂation. As scenario [ii]
becomes more (less) likely, the actions of the monetary authority become more (less) futile.
These powerful expectational eﬀects are precisely what undermines “sound” ﬁscal policy.
But is a rational expectations framework appropriate in an environment where agents
have almost no guidance from their government about how the ﬁscal stress will be re-
solved? Given that policy uncertainty must be cleanly modeled in a rational expectations
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framework—that is, agents’ subjective probability distributions must coincide with actual
probability distributions—a non-rational expectations framework may be better suited to ad-
dress questions of anchoring expectations. If agents have substantial uncertainty over which
regime will materialize, allowing for subjective distributions to be robust to alternative policy
scenarios seems reasonable.
We mention two examples of work that examines ﬁscal policy uncertainty and deviates
from the rational expectations paradigm. First, Eusepi and Preston (2010a,b) use a learning
environment to give the notion of “anchoring ﬁscal expectations” precise content. They show
that learning dynamics restricts the set of equilibria, relative to the rational expectations
framework, in a model with uncertainty about monetary and ﬁscal policy. A key result is
that the advantages of anchoring monetary policy are greatly diminished if ﬁscal expectations
are not equally anchored. Agents must learn about stabilization policies in both ﬁscal and
monetary policy simultaneously. A stable, learnable monetary policy rule is not eﬀective
without a “passive” and learnable ﬁscal policy rule.
Second, Karantounias, Hansen, and Sargent (2009) introduce model uncertainty into
the optimal ﬁscal policy problem of Lucas and Stokey (1983), and ﬁnd that “expectations
management” plays an important role that is absent from a rational expectations framework.
A social planner has a novel incentive to smooth the shadow value of the agents’ subjective
beliefs concerning government debt. Hence, optimal policy requires an anchoring of subjective
ﬁscal expectations.
In describing the uncertainty surrounding ﬁscal policy, Sargent (2006) replaces the usual
probability triple with a series of question marks. Entering an era of prolonged ﬁscal stress
suggests that the level of uncertainty will only increase. Perhaps deviating from the rational
expectations paradigm is necessary to capture this form of Knightian uncertainty.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have argued that there are striking parallels between monetary and ﬁscal policies in terms
of controlling inﬂation, aﬀecting the real economy, and stabilizing the value of government
debt. It is strange, therefore, that most macroeconomic research focuses on one policy alone,
to the exclusion of the other policy. This artiﬁcial dichotomy runs the risk of providing
misleading or incomplete understandings of how unresolved ﬁscal stress aﬀects the economy
and how alternative resolutions to the stress will play out.
Our call for research on ﬁscal stress carries an urgency not often present in academic
work. Policy decisions will be made, even in a research void. The time to ﬁll that void is
now.
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